Washington Post:

Gill signed his entries “Fatality666” and once called himself “Trench,” an apparent reference to the black trench coat he wore in imitation of the two teenage assailants who killed 12 students and a faculty member at Columbine High School in Colorado in 1999. He was fascinated by that attack, according to his journal, and played Super Columbine Massacre RPG, a video game that re-creates the rampage. He also raved about “Postal3,” a similar assault game, and listed a variety of other favorite games, most of them with themes of mayhem.

“Life is a video game. You’ve got to die sometime,” Gill wrote.

Here.

Washington Post:

Fact No. 8, probably one of the most important, notes that, contrary to what you might have heard, the prisoners actually really want to be in Guantanamo. “The mother of a detainee stated: ‘Of course they wanted to stay there. . . . They had human rights and good living standards there. They had dentists and good meals — everything they wanted.’ ” Turns out, this quote from a March 2004 edition of the London Times was a Russian mother comparing Guantanamo with Russian jails.

There was “Arabic language TV,” a large library with books in 13 languages. “The most requested book is ‘Harry Potter,’ ” we’re told.

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The New Yorker:

In 2002, Abu Musab al-Suri, in his hideout in Iran, began  writing his defining work, “Call for Worldwide Islamic Resistance,” which is sixteen hundred pages long and was published on the Internet in December, 2004. Didactic and repetitive, but also ruthlessly candid, the book dissects the  faults of the jihadi movement and lays out a plan for the future of the struggle. The goal, he  writes, is “to bring about the largest number of  human and material casualties possible for  America and its allies.” He specifically targets  Jews, “Westerners in general,” the members of  the NATO alliance, Russia, China, atheists,  pagans, and hypocrites, as well as “any type of  external enemy.” (The proliferation of  adversaries mirrors Al Qaeda’s hatred of all other ideologies.
And yet, at the same time, he bitterly blames Al Qaeda for dragging the entire jihadi movement into an unequal battle that it is likely to lose. Unlike most jihadi theorists, Suri acknowledges the setback caused by September 11th. He laments the demise of the Taliban, which he and other Salafi jihadis considered the modern world’s only true Islamic government. America’s “war on terror,” he complains, doesn’t discriminate between Al Qaeda adherents and Muslims in general. “Many loyal Muslims,” he writes, believe that the September 11th attacks “justified the American assault and have given it a legitimate rationale for reoccupying the Islamic world.” But Suri goes on to argue that America’s plans for international domination were already evident “in the likes of Nixon and Kissinger,” and that this agenda would have been pursued without the provocation of September 11th.

Moreover, the American attack on Afghanistan was not really aimed at capturing or killing bin Laden; its true goal was to sweep away the Taliban and eliminate the rule of Islamic law.
In Suri’s view, the underground terrorist movement—that is, Al Qaeda and its sleeper cells—is defunct. This approach was “a failure on all fronts,” because of its inability to achieve military victory or to rally the Muslim people to its cause. He proposes that the next stage of jihad will be characterized by terrorism created by individuals or small autonomous groups (what he terms “leaderless resistance”), which will wear down the enemy and prepare the ground for the far more ambitious aim of waging war on “open fronts”—an outright struggle for territory. He explains, “Without confrontation in the field and seizing control of the land, we cannot establish a state, which is the strategic goal of the resistance.”

Here.

Washington Post:

Intelligence officials think that bin Laden is hiding in the northern reaches of the autonomous tribal region along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. This calculation is based largely on a lack of activity elsewhere and on other intelligence, including a videotape, obtained exclusively by the CIA and not previously reported, that shows bin Laden walking on a trail toward Pakistan at the end of the battle of Tora Bora in December 2001, when U.S. forces came close but failed to capture him.

Many factors have combined in the five years since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks to make the pursuit more difficult. They include the lack of CIA access to people close to al-Qaeda’s inner circle; Pakistan’s unwillingness to pursue him; the reemergence of the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan; the strength of the Iraqi insurgency, which has depleted U.S. military and intelligence resources; and the U.S. government’s own disorganization.

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Washington Post:

Baghdad’s morgue almost tripled its count for violent deaths in Iraq’s capital during August from 550 to 1,536, authorities said Thursday, appearing to erase most of what U.S. generals and Iraqi leaders had touted as evidence of progress in a major security operation to restore order in the capital.

Separately, the Health Ministry confirmed Thursday that it planned to construct two new branch morgues in Baghdad and add doctors and refrigerator units to raise capacity to as many as 250 corpses a day.

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